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ARGUMENTS
I.

BECAUSE MR. ALBERT AGREES WITH THE PREMISE THAT
ORDERS DEALING WITH §34A-2-413 ARE NOT FINAL APPEALABLE
ORDERS UNTIL AFTER ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 413 HAVE
BEEN MET, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE TO THE
LABOR COMMISSION FOR A SECOND-STEP PROCEEDING
CONSISTENT WITH § 413

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor
Commission is not final until notice of a second-step proceeding is sent to the parties involved
and the parties have an opportunity to submit a rehabilitation plan at a rehabilitation hearing
conducted by the Commission. Mr. Johnny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") agrees that the
plain language of the statute provides that an order of permanent total disability is not final until
the second step proceeding occurs or the parties waive their right to the proceeding. See, Mr.
Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 5. Based upon this recognition of the plain language of the statute,
Mr. Albert does not dispute the fact the plain language of the statute is explicit and, therefore, the
Court of Appeals erred when it attempted to harmonize the statute with the Labor Commission
rule.
Specifically, Mr. Albert argues that this Court should strike the administrative rule that
provides that a tentative finding of permanent total disability is a final agency action for purposes
of review. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6, Note 2. Mr. Albert explicitly provides that
"[t]he Rule [Utah Admin. Code R612-l-10.C.l(c)] must yield to the statute, and this Court
should strike this Rule." Id. In essence, Mr. Albert is arguing the same points that Ameritemps
argued in its Appellants' Brief - that the Court of Appeals erred in synthesizing the
administrative rule with the statute and the plain language of the statute should be enforced in
this case.
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Mr. Albert attempts to argue that Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of disability
and/or waived its rights to a second step proceeding. This argument is without merit and is not
properly before this Court as Mr. Albert failed to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on
whether Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of permanent total disability. See, Ameritemps,
Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, 1f 13, 128 P.3d 31. Ameritemps hereby adopts the
arguments made in its Motion to Strike Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee Brief, attached to
the Appendix hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference.
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ameritemps did not stipulate to a final
order of permanent total disability, nor did it waive its rights to a second step rehabilitation
proceeding. Ameritemps., 2005 UT App 491, f 13. Mr. Albert did not appeal this finding by the
Court of Appeals and, therefore, the Court of Appeals ruling regarding the same stands as the
issue is not properly before this Court for determination.
Moreover, this Court has provided that the only issue properly before it for review is
"[w]hether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, Order dated March 29,
2006 (hereinafter the "Order"), attached to the Appendix hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated
herein by this reference. As the issue of whether a stipulation did or did not occur is outside the
scope of the issue certified for review by this Court, the issue is moot as it is not properly before
this Court.
Regardless, Mr. Albert concedes in his briefing that Utah Administrative Rule R612-110.C.l(c) was improperly utilized by the Utah Court of Appeals and should be stricken from the
Rules. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6. As a result of this concession, Mr. Albert is in
agreement with Ameritemps' argument that the Court of Appeals decision should be overturned

5

for improperly synthesizing the Rule with the statute. The result of overturning the Court of
Appeals decision and upholding the plain language of § 34A-2-413 is to remand this case for a
second-step rehabilitation proceeding consistent with the statute.
REPLY TO AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
II.

UNION PACIFIC IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE §34a-2-413 ITSELF DETAILS WHEN A
FINAL AGENCY ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL HAS
OCCURRED, THEREBY OBVIATING THE NEED FOR THE UNION
PACIFIC ANALYSIS

American Asbestos Abatement and the Workers' Compensation Fund (hereinafter
"AAA") approves of the Utah Court of Appeals analysis and would have this Court apply the
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, test
despite the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. The need for the Union Pacific test,
however, was developed as a result of a question as to what decisions in the various
administrative agencies were appealable so as to start the time for the appeal running. In this
case, the statute itself determines when an order of permanent total disability is final and when it
is tentative, thereby obviating the need for the Union Pacific Test.
As previously stated, this Court already has ruled that it "will interpret a statute according
to its plain meaning and seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Machock v. Fink, 2006
UT 30, f 16, - P.3d ~ (citing, State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, If 11, - P.3d --). The plain language
of § 413 (6)(a) makes clear that an order of permanent total disability is not final until notice of a
second step is provided, the employer provides a rehabilitation plan or waives said plan, and the
administrative law judge holds a hearing on said rehabilitation plan.
By utilizing the Union Pacific test in the instant case would only add confusion and
muddy the water on what has previously been considered a fairly straight-forward statute. By
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utilizing the Union Pacific Test, this Court would add another layer of unnecessary procedure
when the statute itself explicitly mandates when a final agency action for purposes of appeal has
occurred with respect to permanent total disability cases. As a result, Ameritemps requests this
Court interpret the plain language of the statute as the statute unambiguously provides that a final
agency action for purposes of permanent total disability has not occurred until the Labor
Commission has provided the opportunity for a second-step rehabilitation hearing. As this was
not done in this case, the plain language of the statute should be followed and a second-step
rehabilitation hearing should be awarded so as to comply with the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court remand this case
to the Labor Commission for proceedings consistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(6) as the Labor Commission's Order was not a final appealable order.
DATED THIS

^

da

y of August, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL ^ - x _ ^
TraODOREE. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum is
included herewith.
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EXHIBIT A
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD
INSURANCE,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF

Respondents/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119
vs.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and
JOHNNY ALBERT,

Appellate Case No.:

20040953-CA

Agency Case Nos.:

991213,20011073

Petitioners/Appellees.

COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The purpose of this brief is to enforce the Utah Supreme Court's Order providing the
scope of this appeal. Ameritemps has complied with the singular issue certified by this Supreme
Court for review. Mr. Jolinny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") not only addressed the singular
issue certified for by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before
the Court of Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's
grant of review and, therefore, should be stricken from the record.
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Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests the Supreme Court strike
portions of Mr. Albert's Appellee's Brief that exceed the scope of the issue certified for review
before the Supreme Court.
DATED THIS

* 7 day of August, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

fHI^DORg E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Appellants

Y
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD
INSURANCE,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Respondents/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119
Vb.

Appellate Case No.: 20040953-CA
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and
JOHNNY ALBERT,

Agency Case Nos.:

991213,20011073

Petitioners/Appellees.

COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Ameritemps requests that portions of Mr. Johnny Albert's (hereinafter "Mr. Albert")
Appellee Brief be stricken from the record for exceeding the scope of the issues certified for
review before the Utah Supreme Court. Not only did Mr. Albert file his Appellee Brief a day
after the stipulated date for filing his brief had passed, but also Mr. Albert exceeded the scope of
this Court's grant of review. Mr. Albert not only addressed the singular issue certified for review

by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before the Court of
Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's grant of review
and, therefore, should be stricken from the record. Mr. Albert did not file a cross petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court and, therefore, Mr. Albert is limited in his
arguments to the issue certified by Utah Supreme Court and can no longer restate or reargue
issues that he did not appeal from the Utah Court of Appeals decision.
As a result of failing to file his own petition for writ of certiorari challenging other
rulings made by the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Albert is precluded from otherwise challenging
said rulings and findings made by the Court of Appeals. As the Utah Supreme Court only
allowed a very narrow issue to be briefed on review, the Utah Supreme Court's order on the writ
of certiorari should be enforced and portions of Mr. Albert's brief that exceed the scope of the
issue on review should be stricken from the record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in the underlying
appeal. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 491, 138 P.3d 31, attached hereto
as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference.
2. Due to the Tenth falling on a weekend, Ameritemps filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
on December 12, 2005. See, Ameritemps'Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
3. On March 29, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court filed its Order granting Ameritemps'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See, Order dated March 29, 2006 (hereinafter the "Order"),
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference.
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4. In its Order, the Utah Supreme Court identified the sole issue to be addressed on review:
''Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, The Order, Exhibit B.
5. Mr. Albert did not file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and did not otherwise challenge
the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions. See, Court Docket.
ARGUMENTS
I.

PORTIONS OF MR. ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF SHOULD BE
STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD AS THOSE PORTIONS CONTAIN
ARGUMENTS THAT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING AMERITEMPS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court granted Ameritemps' Petition for Writ of Certiorari on a singular issue
pertaining to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 and what is considered a final order for purposes of
Appellate Review. Specifically, this Court provided in its Order granting the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari that "...the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only as to the following issue:
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." The Order, Exhibit B.
Ostensibly, anything that does not address the only issue presently before the Utah Supreme
Court should be stricken for exceeding the scope of the language in the Order. Anything that
exceeds the scope of the order should be stricken as not properly before this Court on review.
Because the record is devoid of any Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Mr. Albert
with respect to the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling below, the only issue properly before the Utah
Supreme Court is the singular question noted above. More importantly, the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "URAP") provide that "[ujnless otherwise provided by law, the
review of a judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Utah Court
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of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court."
URAPRule45.
Mr. Albert's failure to file for a writ of certiorari within the period set forth in URAP
Rule 48 (30 days) now precludes Mr. Albert from re-arguing the points he presented before the
Utah Court of Appeals. As further provided for in the rules, the petition for writ of certiorari is
important as the "only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be
considered by the Supreme Court." URAP Rule 49(a)(4). It was within Mr. Albert's ability to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals decision, but Mr. Albert
failed to file said petition and now is precluded from re-arguing or otherwise challenging the
findings and conclusions of the Utah Court of Appeals.
A review of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief illustrates that Mr. Albert is attempting to
challenge certain findings and conclusions made by the Court of Appeals. Because Mr. Albert
has exceeded the scope of the narrow question of law certified for review by this Court, portions
of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken as exceeding the scope of the issue being
considered by this Court.
Specifically, in sections 1-A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief he reiterates his
arguments proffered to the Utah Court of Appeals thereby attempting to expand the scope of the
issue before the Utah Supreme Court. Section 1-A discusses jurisdiction of this Court to hear the
appeal currently pending before this Court. Mr. Albert admits the Labor Commission did not
schedule a second step hearing, but argues that it did not do so because the Labor Commission
considered Mr. Albert unemployable. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 1. No such finding
was ever made by the Labor Commission, nor by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Section 1A of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal.
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Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal
as Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court challenging the Court
of Appeals' ruling on whether Ameritemps waived its rights to a second step proceeding. The
Court of Appeals specifically found that Ameritemps did not waive its rights to a second step
proceeding as alleged by Mr. Albert. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App
491, U 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari
challenging this finding by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Mr. Albert's arguments against
this finding should be stricken from the record as it exceeds the scope of the singular issue
currently before this Court. As a result, Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be
stricken from the record on appeal.
Similarly, Section 1-C in Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record
as it does not address the issue certified for review by this Court and re-argues issues Mr. Albert
presented to the Court of Appeals but did not appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. As Mr. Albert
did not appeal the merits of Ameritemps' appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals and did not file its
own cross-petition for writ of certiorari, Mr. Albert's arguments should be limited to the singular
argument certified by this Court for review. Consequently, Section 1-C should be stricken from
the record.
As with Section 1-B, above, Section 1-D of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be
stricken as Mr. Albert did not appeal the finding of the Court of Appeals with respect to the
Court's analysis regarding the stipulation. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT
App 491, t 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert's failure to file a cross-petition for writ of
certiorari cannot be remedied at this late date by including arguments that he should have
appealed to this Court.
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Given the strict rules regarding certification of questions to the Supreme Court as
provided in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Albert's failure to comply with said
rules and properly challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on the issue of the stipulation is
precluded as outside of the scope of the issue certified for review by this Court. If Mr. Albert
felt strongly that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis on the stipulation at the hearing, Mr.
Albert should have filed his own petition for writ of certiorari and challenged said findings by
the Court of Appeals.
To argue the case now, however, impermissibly exceeds the scope of the issue certified
for review by this Court. As Mr. Albert's arguments in Section 1-D in his Appellee Brief
exceeds the scope of the issue certified for review it should be stricken from the record on
appeal.
Finally, for the reasons detailed in Section 1-D, above, Section 1-E should be stricken
from the record on appeal as Mr. Albert again challenges the Court of Appeals' analysis
regarding its analysis on the finality of the underlying tentative finding of permanent total
disability. For the reasons asserted in opposition to Section 1-D, above, Ameritemps requests
this Court strike Section 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief for exceeding the scope of the issue
certified for review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court strike Sections 1A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief. Not only was Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief filed
after the cutoff date for filing his Appellee Brief, but also the issues raised in his Appellee Brief
exceed the scope of the singular issue certified for review by this Court.

The arguments

exceeding the scope of the issue on review should be stricken from the record on appeal.
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DATED THIS
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day of August, 2006.
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THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Appellants
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day of August, 2006, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served, postage prepaid, via first class mail on the following:
Richard Burke, Esq.
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP
7390 South Creek Road, Suite 104
Sandy, Utah 84093
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392 East 6400 South
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Attorney for American Asbestos Abatement and
Workers' Compensation Fund

Allen L. Hennebold, Esq.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146600
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James R. Black, Esq.
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EXHIBIT A

Page 1

LEXSEE 2005 UTAPP 491
Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance, Petitioners, v. Labor Commission,
Workers' Compensation Fund, American Asbestos Abatement, and Johnny Albert,
Respondents.
Case No. 20040953-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UTApp 491; 128 P.3d 31; 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 55; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS
469
November 10, 2005, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted
Ameritemps v. Lbr Cmmn, 2006 Utah LEXIS 63 (Utah,
Mar. 30, 2006)

substantively identical to the relevant portions of
the version in effect at the time of Albert's injury,
see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1995), we
cite to the most current version throughout this
opinion as a convenience to the reader.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
j***2]
COUNSEL: Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C.
Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.
Richard R. Burke, James R. Black, Alan L. Hennebold,
and Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
JUDGES: Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thome.
OPINIONBY: Carolyn B. McHugh
OPINION: [**34] Original Proceeding in this Court
McHUGH, Judge:
[***1] [*P1] Ameritemps, Inc. (Ameritemps) and
Hartford Insurance (collectively, Petitioners) seek judicial review of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their motion for
review of a decision of a Commission Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) awarding Johnny Albert permanent
total disability compensation benefits. See Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005). nl We affirm.

nl We recognize that "in workers' compensation claims, the law existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that injury." Brown &
Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'ti, 947 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah 1997). Because the relevant portions of the current version of this statute, see
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-4J3 (Supp. 2005), are

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Over the span of approximately seven years,
Albert was injured in a number of industrial accidents
that occurred while he was working for various employers. With the exception of his final accident, Albert returned to work after each incident, despite having suffered some level of whole person impairment. In his final
industrial accident, which occurred on June 16, 1997,
while he was working for Ameritemps, Albert severely
injured his left foot. Although he had four separate surgeries to correct the problems that resulted from this injury, Albert never returned to work.
[*P3] Thereafter, Albert filed a claim with the
Commission against Ameritemps for, among other
things, permanent total disability compensation benefits.
On December 17, 2002, a hearing was held before the
ALJ, which addressed numerous claims Albert had filed
with the Commission, including his claims against
Ameritemps. Albert's other claims were for disability
benefits arising out of industrial accidents that occurred
while he was working for employers other than Ameritemps. On July 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision regarding Albert's claims.
[*P4] As an initial matter, the ALJ [***3] noted in
the decision that all of the parties opposing Albert's
claims, including Ameritemps, had "conceded that [he]
was permanently and [**35] totally disabled," but that
each party "alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by [each party] directly caused [Al-

Page 2
2005 UT App 491, *3 128 P 3d 31, **,
538 Utah Adv Rep 55, 2005 Utah App LEXIS 469, ***
beit]'s peimanent and total disability" The ALJ found,
based upon a medical evaluation contained in the lecoid,
that the left foot mjuiy Albeit had suffeied while woikmg foi Ameiitemps "caused him a 4% whole person impairment " The ALJ also found that

the piepondeiance of the evidence in this
case revealed that despite the legion of
medical and psychological impaiiments
accumulated by [Albeit] dining the couise
of his life, he remained able to woik until
the mjuiy he sustained on June 16, 1997[,]
with Ameiitemps [His left foot mjuiy] on
June 16, 1997, with the subsequent foui
suigenes and 4% whole peison peimanent
impairment, proved to be the proveibial
stiaw that broke the camel's back [Albert]
nevei leturned to woik aftei the June 16,
1997 industrial accident, and theieafter by
consensus remained peimanently and totally disabled
[*P5] Based upon these findings, the [***4] applicable statute, see Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-413 (Supp
2005), and the odd-lot doctrine, see, e g , Peck v Eimco
Pjocess Equip Co, 748 P2d 572, 574-75 (Utah J987),
Zupon v Industrial Comm'n, 860 P2d 960, 963-64
(Utah Ct App J993), the ALJ concluded that Albert was
permanently totally disabled and that the June 16, 1997
industiial accident, which occurred while Albeit was
employed by Ameiitemps, "dnectly caused his permanent total disability" Accordingly, the ALJ enteied an
awaid of permanent total disability compensation benefits in favoi of Albert and against Petitioners
[*P6] On August 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a motion for review with the Boaid On May 2, 2004, the
Boaid issued an order denying Petitioneis' motion, affnming and adopting the ALJ's factual findings, and affnmmg the ALJ's decision as it applied to Petitioneis
Petitioneis now seek judicial leview of that oidei
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] Petitioners aigue that this couit does not
have subject mattei jurisdiction to leview the Board's
Older A challenge to subject matter junsdiction piesents
a question [***5] of law, which we leview foi conectness See Beavei County v Qwest, Inc , 2001 UT81, P8,
31 P 3d 1147
[*P8] Petitioneis also aigue that theie is evidence
in the recoid that piecludes an awaid of permanent total
disability compensation benefits to Albeit and, as such,
the Boaid incorrectly applied the law to the facts m this
case When leviewmg the Boaid's decision, we will dis-

tuib its factual findings only if they aie "not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed m light of the whole
lecoid befoie the couit" Utah Code Ann § 63-46b16(4)(g) (2004) Further, "when an agency has discietion
to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not distuib the agency's application unless its deteimmation
exceeds the bounds of leasonableness and rationality "
Smith v Mity Lite, 939 P 2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct App
1997) (quotations and citation omitted)
ANALYSIS
[*P9] Befoie arguing then challenge to the Board's
substantive decision, Petitioneis aigue that theie has
been no final agency action Clearing subject mattei junsdiction m this couit because the ALJ and the Boaid did
not complete the two-step [***6] piocess set foith undei
the Workers' Compensation Act for establishing permanent total disability See Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-413
(Supp 2005) In response, the Commission, Albert,
Amencan Asbestos Abatement, and Workeis' Compensation Fund (collectively, Respondents) asseit that Petitioneis failed to preserve this issue foi appeal and waived
any aigument that Albeit is not permanently totally disabled For the leasons set forth below, we affirm
I Pieseivation and Waiver
[*P10] Petitioners concede that they did not raise
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction pnor to their bnef
with this couit Notwithstanding that admission, we may
consider it "Questions regarding subject mattei jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such issues deteimme whether a court has authority to addiess the meilts of [**36] a particular case " Housing Auth v Snydei, 2002 UT28, Pll, 44 P 3d 724 In addition, because
subject mattei junsdiction is a pieiequisite to this court's
power to considei the substantive issues, the lequnement
that the court have pi oper jurisdiction ovei the subject of
the dispute cannot be waived See, e g , [***7] Chen v
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P34, 100 P 3d 1177, Barnard v
Wassermann, 855 P 2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993) Issues
lelating to subject mattei jurisdiction aie tmeshold questions that should be addressed before lesolving othei
claims See Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at PI 1 Because we
conclude that Petitioneis' challenge to subject mattei
jurisdiction is pioperly befoie us, we consider it befoie
addiessmg their challenge to the Board's substantive decision
II Subject Mattel Jurisdiction
[*P11] The Utah Admimstiative Piocedmes Act
grants junsdiction to the appellate courts over "final
agency actions " Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-14(l), (3)(a)
(2004) Thus, the first issue foi consideiation is whethei
the Board's decision finding Albeit peimanently totally
disabled is a "final agency action," id, ovei which this
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court can exeicise subject mattei junsdiction To answei
that question, we must examine the specific statutoiy
piovisions involved
[*P12] The piocedme foi establishing peimanent
total disability is set foith in the Workeis' Compensation
Act See id § 34A-2-413 Undei that statutory [***8]
scheme, the injuied employee must first meet his oi her
buiden of establishing peimanent total disability and
causation by a piepondeiance of the evidence See id §
34A-2-413(l)(b) The Commission must then considei
the evidence to determine whethei the employee is peimanently totally disabled and unable to peifoim leasonably available work See id § 34A-2-413(l)(c) Befoie
disability benefits can be awaided, however, the Commission must follow a two-step piocess outlined in section 34A-2-413 See id § 34A-2-413(6) The Utah Supieme Couit explained the piocedme foi awaidmg such
benefits in Thomas v Coloi Country Management, 2004
UT 12, 84 P 3d 1201, stating

Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the piocess
an administrative law judge must follow
when deteimining whethei an injuied employee is entitled to permanent total disability compensation This section lequnes that a finding be issued m two
paits—an initial finding and a final finding The initial finding of permanent total
disability tnggeis a leview period m
which the employei oi its insuiance carnei may submit a leemployment plan
[See Utah Code Ann] §
34A-2413(6)(a)(n) [***9] , (d) This subsection
specifically states that the initial "finding
by the Commission of peimanent total
disability is not final, unless otheiwise
agieed to by the paities, until" the employei has the oppoitunity to submit a leemployment plan, the admimstiative law
judge leviews this leemployment plan and
the leemployment activities undei taken
puisuant to statute, and the admimstiative
law judge holds a healing Id § 34A-2413(6)(a) The intent of the leemployment
plan is to detei mine whethei the injuied
employee can be lehabihtated in older to
leentei the woikforce, and a final finding
of permanent total disability is held m leseive until the possibilities of leemployment aie either exhausted oi abandoned
Only aftei all of these requirements have
been met does the finding of peimanent
total disability become final

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P21 The Boaid's decision in this
case was issued aftei the initial detei mmation of total
peimanent disability, but befoie any oppoitunity foi Petitionee to submit a leemployment plan Thus, by the expiess terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, the "finding by the [Board] of peimanent total disability is not
|***2Qj f lna i } unless otherwise agreed to by the paities,
until" aftei the employei is given an oppoitunity to submit a reemployment plan Utah Code Ann § 34A-2413(6)(a)
[*P13] Respondents aigue that the parties agreed
that the initial deteimmation of the Boaid was final as a
lesult of a colloquy between the ALJ and counsel foi
Amentemps When the ALJ asked whether Amentemps
was challenging that Albeit was permanently totally disabled, counsel for Amentemps lesponded "I don't have
any pioof to the contraiy I'm not heie to submit [**37]
pi oof on that issue " We agree with the ALJ's determination that Amentemps conceded that Albert was peimanently totally disabled foi purposes of the initial finding
of disability and causation Theie is nothing in the discussion between the ALJ and counsel foi Amentemps,
howevei, that supports a finding that Amentemps intended to waive its light to submit a leemployment plan
if the mdustnal accident that occuned while Albeit was
employed by Amentemps was found to be the duect
cause of Albeit's peimanent total disability Thus, if this
court has subject matter junsdiction, it must be based on
a conclusion that the [***H] initial determination of
permanent total disability is a final agency action
[*P14] From a cuisoiy leading of the Woikeis'
Compensation Act's pionouncement that the initial deteimmation is not final, it might appear that this couit
need inquiie no fuithei to conclude that the Boaid's oidei
at issue is not a "final agency action," id § 63-46b14(1), (3)(a), and that this couit is without subject mattei
junsdiction The analysis of the Utah Supreme Couit in
Thomas, however, requues that we considei both
whethei the initial deteimmation by the Board is a "final
oidei" of that agency, and sepaiately, whethei it is a "final agency action " See 2004 UT 12 at PI4 Although the
terms aie similai, they aie diffeient in then effect on this
court's jurisdiction
[*P15] In Thomas, the Utah Supieme Court considered whethei an initial deteimmation of permanent
total disability undei section 34A-2-413 was a '"final
older'" of the Commission foi which an abstiact of
judgment could be issued allowing the employee to enforce the tempoiary disability awaid in district court Id
at PI I Aftei reviewing the language of section 34A-2413, the Thomas [***12] court concluded that "because
initial findings aie not final ordeis subsistence payment
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oiders piedicated upon initial findings are also not final
oideis " Id at P25 In the absence of a final oidei fiom
the Commission, no abstiact was available See Utah
Code Ann § 34A-2-212(l)(a) (2001) ("An abstract of
any final order piovidmg an awaid may be filed
m
the office of the cleik of the district couit of any county
in the state ")
[*P16] In leaching its conclusion, the Thomas
couit distinguished between a '"final oidei"1 of an agency
that could support an abstract of judgment and a '"final
agency action'" that can confer subject mattei jurisdiction
on the appellate couits Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P14

Although the Utah Administrative Piocedures Act giants junsdiction to the appellate courts ovei "final agency actions," it
"does not specifically define" this teim
Baikei v Utah Pub Seiv Comm'n, 970
P2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998) Since this act
does not provide a definition, we developed the Union Pacific test to determine
when adrmnistiative oideis constitute "final agency actions" [***13] in order to
invoke appellate junsdiction [See Union
Pac RR Co v Utah State Tax Comm'n,
2000 UT 40, PI 6, 999 P 2d 17] Unlike
the term "final agency action," the term
"final ordei" is defined in the Woikeis'
Compensation Act Because this act
clearly defines "final older," we need not
turn to Union Pacific foi guidance on
what constitutes a "final oidei" foi which
an abstiact may issue Thus, what constitutes a final ordei foi purposes of appellate review is different than what constitutes a final oidei for purposes of the issuance of an abstiact of an admmistiative
awaid

Thomas 2004 UT 12 at P14 The Thomas court then
deteimined that an initial finding of peimanent total disability was not a "final oidei" as defined by the Woikeis'
Compensation Act See id at P25 But, the Thomas court
did not considei whether an initial decision of the Commission finding permanent total disability is a "final
agency action" that can confei subject mattei junsdiction
on an appellate court foi puiposes of judicial leview It
meiely indicated that the analysis of that question should
be peiformed using the test announced [***14] in Union
Pacific See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5
[*P17] The recent per cunam decision fiom a divided panel of this court in Taiget Titicking v Laboi

Commission, 2005 UT App 70 108 P 3d 128 (mem) (per
cunam), [**38] may have confused these two concepts
In Taiget Trucking, we dismissed an appeal of a piehminary determination of permanent total disability foi lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the statutoiy
language See id at P6, see also Utah Code Ann § 34A2-413(6)(a) ("A finding by the Commission of peimanent total disability is not final, unless otheiwise agieed
to by the parties
") In doing so, this court made no
distinction between a "final oidei" and a "final agency
action," and did not apply the Union Pacific three-pait
test to determine whethei we should exercise appellate
jurisdiction See Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6 In considering the issue now befoie this court, we apply that
test to answei the initial question concerning this court's
subject mattei jurisdiction "Although the Union Pacific
test does not apply to determining what constitutes
[***15] a 'final ordei' for which an abstract may issue
under the Workers' Compensation Act, Union Pacific
continues to be the standard by which 'final admmistiative action' will be judged foi the purpose of judicial leview " Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5
[*P18] In Union Pacific, the Utah Supieme Court
adopted the following thiee-part test to determine
whether an agency action is final

(1) Has administrative decision making
reached a stage where judicial review will
not disrupt the oideily process of adjudication9,
(2) Have lights oi obligations been deteirmned or will legal consequences flow
from the agency action9, and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or m
part, not preliminary, prepaiatory, piocedural, oi intermediate with legard to subsequent agency action9

Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6 Agency actions that
meet the foiegomg test aie appealable fiom the date of
the oi dei's issuance See id
[*P19] Examining the Boaid's ordei undei the
thiee-part test set forth in Union Pacific, we conclude
that the older is a final agency action
A Orderly Pi ocess of Adjudication
[*P20] This mattei comes [***16] to this court aftei the Boaid's denial of Petitioners' motion for review of
the ALJ's decision "By denying leconsideiation of its
eaihei findings and conclusions, the [Boaid] leached the
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end ot its decision making process" on the issue of permanent total disability. Id. at PI9. The Board's order
denying Petitioners' motion for review includes a "Notice
of Appeal Rights" section, which provides that a party
may either (1) within twenty days of the date of the order, request that the Board reconsider the order, or (2)
within thirty days of the date of the order, petition this
court for judicial review of the order. A request for reconsideration was filed by a party that was involved in
the proceedings before the Commission, but is not a
party to this appeal. In the Board's order denying that
request for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal
Rights" section identified an appeal to this court as the
only review available. n2 When the Board denied the
request for reconsideration, that marked the end of its
decision making process concerning the issue of permanent total disability.

Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions often take place seriatim, disposing [***17] completely of discrete issues in one order while leaving
other issues for later orders. Such orders
will be final as to any issue fully decided
by that order and appealable any time
from the date of that order to the last day
to appeal the last final agency action in
the case.

Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970 P.2d 702, 706
(Utah 1998). Although issues remained unresolved concerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of
whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was
disposed of completely by the Board. Thus, "judicial
review would not . . . interfere[] with the [Board]'s proceedings, since the [**39] [Board] had already refused
to reconsider its prior order[]." Union Pac, 2000 UT 40
at PI 9.
n2 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that "although omission of this language is not
dispositive for our purposes on the question of
whether an agency order is final, it certainly signals . . . that the [agency] believes it is." Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000
UT40,PI9n.6,999P.2d
17.
[***18]
B. Rights or Obligations Determined
[*P21] In the decision from which Petitioners appeal, the Board determined that Albert is permanently

totally disabled and also awarded permanent total disability compensation payments to Albert to start immediately. Consequently, the second part of the Union Pacific
test is met. See Barker, 970 P.2d at 706 (detemiining
that agency action was final where "the language of the
order makes clear that the [agency] determined obligations of the parties with which the parties must immediately comply"); see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at P20
(concluding that the second prong of the three-part test
was met where taxpayer's tax obligations were determined).
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural, or Intermediate
1*P22J ihe third step in detemiining whether
agency action is final for puiposes of appeal is an analysis of whether that action is, "in whole or in part, not
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate."
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. The Utah Supreme
Court has provided examples of the types of proceedings
that are not final under this last prong of the Union Pacific [***19] analysis.

The Utah cases on finality found no final
order in the following circumstances: (1)
a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v.
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); (2) an order converting informal proceedings into formal
ones, Merit Elec & Instrumentation v.
Department of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151,
153 (Utah Ct App. 1995); and (3) a denial
of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division
of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). These cases do not involve actions
in the nature of a seriatim final order; they
all involve preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decisions.

Barker, 970 P.2d at 706\ see also Union Pac, 2000 I 7
40atP2I.
[*P23] Although the Board's order leaves unresolved the issue of reemployment, it decides permanent
total disability with finality. The order ended the decision
making process at the agency level on this issue. Thus,
the initial determination of permanent total disability was
in the nature of a seriatim final order that was immediately appealable despite the fact that the [***20] agency
still was required to conduct the second part of the section 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert can
be rehabilitated. n3 To the extent our decision in Target
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Ti ticking v Laboi Commission 2005 UT App 70 J08
P 3d 128 (mem) (pei cunam), holds otheiwise, we disavow it and instead follow the mandate of the Utah Supieme Couit in Thomas v Coloi Countiy Management
2004 UT 12, 84 P 3d 1201, to consider the issues of finality foi purposes of appellate jurisdiction undei the
Union Pacific test, see 2000 UT 40 at PJ6

n3 This second step can be avoided if the
paities agree that the finding of peimanent total
disability is final, see Utah Code Ann § 34A-2413(6)(a), oi if the ALJ is piovided with notice
that the employei oi its msmance caniei will not
submit a leemployment plan See id § 34A-2413(6)(a)(u)(B)
[*P24] This conclusion that the initial deteimmation of permanent total disability [***21] is not a final
oi dei of the agency, but is a final agency action, also
leconciles the statutory language with the applicable
legulations Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) expiessly states that
the initial deteimination is not final and, based on that
language, the Utah Supieme Court held in Thomas that
the initial deteimination is not a "final oidei" of the
agency See 2004 UT 12 at P25 In contiast, the Commission's legulations state that "[a] piehmmary deteimination of peimanent total disability by the Laboi Commissionei or [the] Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate judicial leview " Utah Admin Code
R612-l-10(C)(l)(c)
[*P25] Because the concepts of "final oidei" and
"final agency action" aie defined differently, the statute
and the legulation can [**40] be reconciled n4 An initial deteimination of peimanent total disability is not a
final oi dei of the agency and, therefoie, an abstract of
judgment cannot be issued to enfoice a permanent total
disability compensation awaid based on that prehmmaiy
finding See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P25 In contiast, the
pielimmaiy deteimination of peimanent total disability
does conclude the [***22] agency decision making on
the initial question of whethei Albeit is permanently totally disabled Thus, it is a senatim final agency action,
and this court does have subject mattei junsdiction to
review it

n4 In Taiget Tucking v Laboi Commission
2005 UT App 70 P6, 108 P 3d 128 (mem) (pei
cunam), this court concluded, without applying
the Union Pacific test foi finality, that the administrative rule was in conflict with the express
statutory provisions Because we hold that a prehminaiy deteimination of permanent total disabil-

ity is a final agency action, but not a final oidei
of the agency, we now haimonize the rule and the
statute
III Substantive Review of Boaid's Oidei
[*P26] Having concluded that we have subject
mattei jurisdiction to review the Boaid's oidei, we now
turn to Petitioners' substantive challenge to that oidei
Petitioneis argue that theie is evidence in the lecoid that
piecludes an awaid of permanent total disability compensation benefits to Albert and, [***23] therefoie, the
Board mconectly applied the law to the facts in this case
We disagree
[*P27] To advance their argument that there is evidence in the lecord that precludes an award of peimanent
total disability compensation benefits, Petitioneis selectively recite the portions of the lecoid evidence that support their position Based on that selective recitation of
the facts presented to the agency, Petitioners assert that
the Boaid should have reached a different conclusion
This aigument amounts to an mduect challenge to the
Boaid's factual findings concerning the June 16, 1997
mdustiial accident, and is an attempt by Petitioneis to
leaigue the weight of the evidence in favor of then position, which is a futile tactic on appeal See Questai Pipeline Co v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P 2d 1175, 1178
(Utah 1993) ("When leviewmg an agency's decision, [we
do] not
reweigh the evidence ") Further, we will not
disturb the Boaid's findings simply because another conclusion can be drawn fiom the evidence in the lecord
See Whitear v Laboi Comm'n, 973 P 2d 982, 984 (Utah
Ct App 1998) (stating that "findings will 'not be overturned [***24] if based on substantial evidence, even if
anothei conclusion fiom the evidence is permissible'"
(citation omitted)) Because Petitioneis do not duectly
challenge any of the Boaid's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 mdustiial accident, we assume that
they aie supported by the lecoid and do not distuib them
n5 See Heber City Coip v Simpson 942 P 2d 307, 312
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to challenge a factual
finding and maishal the evidence in support of that finding, we 'assumef] that the lecoid suppoits the findmgf]
'" (fust alteiation m original) (citations omitted))

n5 Even if Petitioners had duectly challenged the Boaid's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 mdustiial accident, that challenge would have failed because Petitioneis
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those
findings in then opening brief See Campbell v
Box Eldei County 962 P 2d 806 808 (Utah Ct
App 1998) ("When a party fails to maishal the
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we
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reject the challenge as nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate]
court." (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). Moreover, after this failure was
noted by Respondents in their briefs, Petitioners
attempted to undertake the marshaling burden in
their reply brief and, after doing so, admitted that
there was evidence in the record that "could support" the Board's findings. Our review of the record indicates that the Board's findings are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-J 6(4)(g) (2004).
1***25]
1AP28] Petitioners also argue that the Board misapplied the law to the facts of this case. More specifically,
Petitioners argue that had the Board made different factual findings based upon the aforementioned evidence
that supports their position, it would have reached a different legal conclusion. Given that we have already rejected Petitioners' arguments concerning the Board's factual findings, we must determine whether the Board's
application of the law to those undisturbed findings "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness [**41] and rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted).
[*P29] In relevant part, the statute governing permanent total disability compensation benefits provides:

(b) To establish entitlement to permanent
total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by
a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) the employee sustained
a significant impairment or
combination of impairments as a result of the industiial accident or occupational disease that gives
rise to the permanent total
disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally [***26] disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident
or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the

employee's permanent total
disability.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(I)(b)(i)-(iii).
[*P30] The Board made findings relevant to each
of these elements. With respect to the first element, the
ALJ found n6 that "the preponderance of the evidence in
this case established that [Albertj's industiial accident
with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997[,] caused him a 4%
whole person impairment due to his left foot injury." The
ALJ also found that the preponderance of the evidence
revealed that the injury Albert suffered as a result of the
June 16, 1997 industiial accident, "with the subsequent
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's back." Concerning the second element, the ALJ
found that Albert "never returned to work after the June
16, 1997 industiial accident, and thereafter by consensus
remained permanently and totally disabled." Finally, as
to the third element, the ALJ found that "the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that [Albert]^ industrial accident [***27] of June 16, 1997[,]
acted as the direct cause of his permanent total disability."

n6 In its order, the Board "affirmed and
adopted [the ALJ]'s findings of fact."
1*P31J Based upon these undisturbed findings, the
Board concluded that Albert was permanently totally
disabled and that the June 16, 1997 industiial accident,
which occurred while Albert was employed by Ameritemps, "was the direct cause of his permanent total disability." Accordingly, the Board entered an award of
permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor
of Albert and against Petitioners. Given that the Board
made the appropriate findings to support its conclusion
under the statute, we cannot say that its conclusion "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Mity
Lite, 939 P.2d at 686 (quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, we affirm the Board's order denying Petitioners' motion for review of the ALJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
[*P32] The Board's preliminary determination of
permanent total [***28] disability is a seriatim final
agency action, and this court does have subject matter
jurisdiction to review it. After reviewing the Board's order, we conclude that its factual findings were based
upon substantial evidence and that its application of the
law to those findings did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Therefore, we affirm.
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Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
|*P33] WE CONCUR:
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Labor Commission, and
Johnny Albert,
Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on December 12, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability
under Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-413 constitutes a final agency action
for purposes of appellate review.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
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160 E 300 S STE 300
PO BOX 14 6600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
JAMES R BLACK
BLACK AND INGLEBY
265 E 100 S STE 255
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
FLOYD W HOLM
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 E 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
LABOR COMMISSION
ATTN: SARA DANIELSON
160 E 300 S 3RD FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Dated this March 30, 2006.

Deputy Clerk
/
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Ameritemps, Inc. and/or
Hartford Insurance,
Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 20051119-SC
20040953-CA

Labor Commission, and
Johnny Albert,
Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on December 12, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability
under Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-413 constitutes a final agency action
for purposes of appellate review.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Date

Yl&tcb 3 7 ZlfiOd
Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I nereby certify that on March 30, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
RICHARD R BURKE
KING BURKE & SCHAAP PC
739 0 CREEK RD STE 104
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84 093-5121
THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C ALAMILLA
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 E S TEMPLE STE 1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
ALAN L HENNEBOLD
LABOR COMMISSION
160 E 3 00 S STE 3 00
PO BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
JAMES R BLACK
BLACK AND INGLEBY
265 E 100 S STE 255
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
FLOYD W HOLM
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 E 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
LABOR COMMISSION
ATTN: SARA DANIELSON
160 E 300 S 3RD FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Dated this March 30, 2006.

DepxTty Clerk

/
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